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1 
WHY IT’S CALLED THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT 
Nicholas Bagley*  
Jill R. Horwitz**†
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) raises 
numerous policy and legal issues, but none have attracted as much attention 
from lawyers as Section 1501. This provision, titled “Maintenance of Mini-
mum Essential Coverage,” but better known as the “individual mandate,” 
requires most Americans to obtain health insurance for themselves and their 
dependents by 2014.
 
1 We are dismayed that the narrow issue of the mandate 
and the narrower issue of free riding have garnered so much attention when 
our nation’s health-care system suffers from countless problems. By im-
proving quality, controlling costs, and extending coverage to the uninsured, 
the ACA means to address many of those problems. And it’s about time. The 
United States has lower insurance coverage rates and lower life expectancy 
than most developed countries, and our system does poorly on several di-
mensions of quality. Worse still, we spend much more on health care than 
any other country—$2.5 trillion, or 17.6 percent of gross domestic product, 
in 2009.2 These measures of total spending mask grave distributional con-
cerns: 52 million people went without insurance during some part of 2010.3
Nonetheless, the individual mandate is the legal hook upon which many 
have hung their constitutional challenges to the ACA. In a recent essay, our 
colleague Professor Douglas Kahn joins with Professor Jeffrey Kahn to take 
issue with one of several justifications for the mandate: that it solves the 
free-rider problem that arises when an uninsured individual receives care 
without paying for it, thus forcing providers to raise costs for paying 
 
                                                                                                                      
 † Suggested citation: Nicholas Bagley and Jill R. Horwitz, Commentary, Why It’s 
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 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law 
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending §5000A of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986) [hereinafter “ACA”]. 
 2. National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights, Centers for Medicaid & Medi-
care Services, www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2011). 
 3. Help on the Horizon, The Commonwealth Fund, at ix (2011), 
www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Surveys/2011/Mar/2010-Biennial-Health-Insurance-
Survey.aspx (report accessible through hyperlink). 
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(typically insured) patients. Kahn and Kahn claim that the free-rider prob-
lem has been exaggerated. Even if it were a meaningful problem, they 
argue, the ACA only resolves it by shifting the burden of uncompensated 
care from insured patients to taxpayers, thus substituting one type of free 
riding for another. Finally, they suggest that the free-rider trope hijacked the 
political debate and distracted from the ACA’s redistributive consequences.4
These claims are unconvincing. Kahn and Kahn can maintain that the 
free-rider problem has been exaggerated only because they define “free rid-
er” to mean something it does not. Although their claim that the ACA 
substitutes provider-subsidized free riding for taxpayer-subsidized insurance 
is accurate, Kahn and Kahn fail to appreciate the overwhelming strength of 
the latter approach. And their belief that the free-rider argument somehow 
prevented debate about the ACA’s distributional consequences is, as an em-
pirical matter, simply false. 
 
Notwithstanding their studied agnosticism about the policy wisdom of 
the ACA, Kahn and Kahn exhibit deep discomfort with the ACA’s require-
ment that private insurers ignore beneficiary health status in setting 
premiums and the attendant mandate to purchase insurance. Yet they never 
acknowledge that achieving near-universal coverage through the private 
market depends on these interventions. If insurers could set premiums based 
on individual risk, those most in need of insurance would be unable to af-
ford it. And if healthy people could opt out of risk pools, the resulting 
premium increases for those who remained would likely put insurance out 
of reach for millions. The ACA’s redistribution is thus tied up with questions 
relating to the level of risk-rating that is acceptable in a decent society, the 
purpose of health insurance, and the moral urgency of covering the unin-
sured. Perhaps Kahn and Kahn prefer the status quo; their apparent unhap-
piness with the ACA suggests they do. But although they would have 
preferred the public debate to have focused more intently on redistribution, 
it’s no surprise that debate over health-care reform has ranged more broadly. 
I. A Free Rider by Any Other Name 
Kahn and Kahn deny that a substantial free-rider problem exists in the 
medical marketplace. In their view, the uninsured who cannot afford care are 
not really free riders because they have no meaningful choice but to go to 
the emergency room when they fall ill. 
We’ll cheerfully stipulate that an uninsured, poverty-stricken person 
who, say, breaks her arm, will seek and receive treatment. (That’s why, con-
trary to those bringing constitutional challenges to the individual mandate, 
someone who chooses not to buy health insurance will nonetheless someday 
participate in the interstate health-care market. She can credibly exempt her-
                                                                                                                      
 4. See generally Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Commentary, Free Rider: A 
Justification for Mandatory Medical Insurance Under Health Care Reform?, 109 Mich. L. 
Rev. First Impressions 78, 81, 84-85 (2011), www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/ 
109/kahn.pdf. 
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self from the market for ordinary consumer goods like cars or broccoli; not 
so for health care.) Someone has to pay for her treatment, however. If she 
can’t pay—and the hospital, having tried to collect, can’t get her to pay—
then the hospital must cover the loss. How does the hospital do this? By 
increasing prices for paying patients, including those with insurance (or, 
more worryingly, by providing profitable treatments to well-insured patients 
who don’t need them). In other words, those who can pay for medical care 
also pay for those who can’t. And that makes our friend with the broken arm 
a free rider.5
Kahn and Kahn resist calling her a free rider because they dislike the 
term’s negative connotations. They think she’s done nothing wrong in seek-
ing uncompensated medical care. We agree. But the strength of her 
justification for seeking medical attention shouldn’t obscure its economic 
consequences. She’s still forcing someone else to foot the bill. And she can 
do so only because of the deeply felt social commitment, embedded in vari-
ous state and federal laws, including the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act, to provide emergency medical care even to those who 
can’t pay. This social commitment transforms emergency medical care into 
a nonexcludable, quasi-public good, which allows our broken-armed patient 
to fob the costs of her care onto paying patients. 
 
At bottom, Kahn and Kahn’s argument rests on a semantic dispute over 
the term “free rider.” They accept that providers shift costs from non-paying 
to paying patients. They don’t contest the scale of this cost-shifting: $43 
billion in 2008, leading to an average increase of $1,000 in a family’s annual 
insurance premium.6 They even acknowledge that the broken-armed patient 
“may be [a free rider] within the economist’s use of the term.”7
II. Robin Hood and the ACA 
 Called a 
free-rider problem or not, this cost-shifting is still a problem—and a mas-
sive one at that. 
Which brings us to Kahn and Kahn’s second point. They object to those 
politicians and advocates who, in using the term free rider, hoodwinked the 
public into thinking that the ACA requires citizens to accept personal re-
sponsibility for their own health expenses. In their view, this rhetoric was 
misleading. Shifting costs from non-paying to paying patients, they point 
out, is a form of wealth transfer. Of course, the ACA also transfers wealth, 
albeit through the tax system. It expands Medicaid to cover anyone up to 
133% of the poverty line and subsidizes the purchase of private insurance 
for those between 133% and 400% of the poverty line. In so doing, Kahn 
and Kahn argue, the ACA merely institutionalizes a new kind of 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics 222 (1998) (“A free 
rider is a person who receives the benefit of a good but avoids paying for it.”). 
 6. ACA, § 10106(a) (amending § 1501(a)(2)(F) of the ACA). 
 7. Kahn & Kahn, supra note 4, at 82. 
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cost-shifting by asking taxpayers to pick up the insurance bill for lower-
income Americans. 
To begin with, it seems well within the bounds of fair debate to accu-
rately describe those uninsured who receive uncompensated care as free 
riders. But more importantly, Kahn and Kahn’s critique only begs the ques-
tion: Which kind of distribution is better? Should we finance health care for 
the medically indigent through provider cost-shifting or through the tax sys-
tem? On this, Kahn and Kahn decline to engage. Had they done so, they 
would have found at least five straightforward reasons why provider cost-
shifting is much more damaging than taxpayer-driven redistribution under 
the ACA. 
First, provider cost-shifting operates as a highly regressive tax on paying 
patients. The reason is simple: because providers don’t charge higher-
income patients more for their medical care than lower-income patients, 
increased medical costs—usually seen in higher insurance premiums—are 
shared by all paying customers alike. The inflated cost of medical care occa-
sioned by provider cost-shifting thus eats up a larger fraction of the income 
of a lower-income person than a higher-income person. “This regressive 
pattern contrasts sharply with the progressive profile of effective federal 
income tax rates.”8
Second, provider cost-shifting is surreptitious. Most people have no idea 
that uncompensated care inflates health-insurance premiums. Even if they 
do, those with employer-sponsored insurance probably don’t know that in-
surance coverage is part of compensation and that ever-rising premiums lead 
to reductions in take-home pay.
 
9
Third, medical debts don’t painlessly get wiped away. Like other credi-
tors, health-care providers demand to get paid. Attempting to satisfy those 
demands not only imposes hardship on individuals and families, but it fre-
quently sends the uninsured into a financial tailspin—which is why medical 
debt contributes to about half of all bankruptcies.
 (This typically happens not through wage 
cuts, but rather through slower wage growth.) In contrast, subsidizing insur-
ance for the disadvantaged through the tax system exposes the costs of the 
commitment to near-universal insurance and lends democratic legitimacy to 
the determination of how to distribute those costs. 
10
Fourth, uninsured patients receive worse medical care than those with 
insurance. Uncompensated care is typically acute care, provided in a hospit-
al emergency room, often to address conditions that could have been 
prevented if detected earlier. And this kind of care is much more expensive 
 Requiring the purchase 
of subsidized health insurance eliminates that source of financial instability. 
                                                                                                                      
 8. See Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for Uncompensated Medical 
Care: The Regressive Profile of a “Hidden Tax”, 2 Health Matrix 141, 158 (1992). 
 9. See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market Effects Of Rising 
Health Insurance Premiums, 24 J. Labor Econ. 609 (2006). 
 10. See David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, 
Health Affairs W5-63 (Feb. 2005). 
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than equivalent care provided on an outpatient basis. By expanding insur-
ance coverage, the ACA encourages patients and providers to favor 
inexpensive primary care over expensive emergency care. 
Fifth, and relatedly, the uninsured regularly defer necessary care until 
turning sixty-five, only to run up needlessly large medical expenses when 
they finally become eligible for Medicare.11
In short, using the tax system to extend health insurance to 38 million 
additional people is more progressive, transparent, humane, and efficient 
than the redistribution caused by provider cost-shifting. We do not dispute 
Kahn and Kahn’s observation that the ACA replaces the covert redistribution 
of provider cost-shifting with overt redistribution via the tax system, and 
that both involve redistribution. But we do dispute that minimizing uncom-
pensated care by extending comprehensive health insurance was some sort 
of shell game. 
 By providing near-universal 
insurance coverage, the ACA discourages this wait-until-sixty-five approach 
and increases the likelihood that those who previously lacked insurance will 
secure cheap preventive care prior to entering Medicare. The ACA thus di-
rects taxpayer dollars that would otherwise have gone to cover inefficient, 
late-in-the-day care toward timely and more efficient medical care. 
III. Free Riders Hijacking the Debate 
Kahn and Kahn spend the balance of their piece objecting to a different 
kind of redistribution they believe went unappreciated in the debate over the 
ACA. Here the redistribution they have in mind is a function of the ACA’s 
imposition of community rating, under which insurers are prohibited from 
considering the health status of insurance applicants.12 The annual pre-
miums of younger and healthier members of a community-rated risk pool 
thus subsidize the care of the older and sicker members. In Kahn and Kahn’s 
view, “the advancement of the free-rider justification has prevented the de-
bate over the merits of the program from focusing on the critical question 
whether a redistribution of wealth from the young to the old and from the 
healthy to the unhealthy is an appropriate and desirable goal.”13
This political process complaint is unpersuasive. For starters, the redi-
stributive effects of the ACA as a whole are not as clear-cut as Kahn and 
Kahn suggest. Medicare already covers those sixty-five and older, so any 
redistribution that occurs on the exchange doesn’t involve the elderly. The 
ACA also imposes sharp cuts on Medicare to finance the Medicaid expan-
sion and the exchange subsidies, channeling tax dollars previously claimed 
by the elderly to younger individuals. To mitigate concerns about intergene-
rational transfers, the ACA permits exchange plans to vary premiums up to 
 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured 
Medicare Beneficiaries, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 143 (2007). 
 12. ACA § 1201 (amending § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Public Health Service Act). 
 13. Kahn & Kahn, supra note 4, at 80. 
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three times based on age. And the ACA endeavors to make health care more 
affordable for everyone—including the young and healthy—by eliminating 
medical underwriting and promoting managed competition on the ex-
changes. 
But let’s assume Kahn and Kahn are right. As they frame the matter, de-
bate over the ACA should have focused on the choice between individual 
and community risk-rating. This framing obscures the stakes of that choice, 
however. As it stands, and until the ACA’s coverage provisions go into ef-
fect, private insurers in the individual and small-group markets may, in most 
states, individually risk rate. The result is that millions of Americans can’t 
afford health insurance—especially those with preexisting conditions or ill-
omened risk profiles. Because of insufficient risk-pooling, the market for 
those in greatest need of health insurance has unraveled. Achieving near-
universal coverage through the private market thus depends on some form of 
community rating, meaning that the choice between community rating and 
individual risk-rating is tantamount to the choice between near-universal 
coverage and the exclusion of tens of millions from the insurance market. 
Against this backdrop, it’s unremarkable that political debate over the ACA 
was more than a clinical discussion of the redistributive effects of communi-
ty rating.  
Or look at it another way: Kahn and Kahn have trained their attention on 
the dollar flows from the young and healthy to the old and unhealthy. But to 
gauge the overall redistributive consequences of a public welfare program, 
it’s not enough to observe that the wealthy pay more in taxes and finance the 
bulk of expenditures. Among other things, you also have to tally the value of 
the good provided to beneficiaries via that redistribution, which in this con-
text includes the value of insurance to those who previously couldn’t secure 
it on the private market. Because insurance both prevents financial shocks 
and improves health, that value turns out to be quite large. With respect to 
Medicare, for example, the benefits of coverage accrue so broadly that bene-
ficiaries at every level of income come out ahead in terms of overall 
welfare.14
Still, Kahn and Kahn are right that, taking just a one-year snapshot of 
premiums and outlays, the younger members of a community-rated risk 
pool subsidize the older. But looking at the problem this way betrays an as-
sumption that a calendar year provides the proper frame of reference for 
thinking about health insurance. That’s not obviously so. All of us have been 
young, and almost all of us will grow old. If one widens the lens to consider 
lifetime health risks (or, more accurately, health risks prior to qualifying for 
Medicare), a young person’s higher premium isn’t an intergenerational 
 The distributional consequences of the ACA may or may not be as 
rosy. But it would have been strange for the public debate to focus on wealth 
transfers from young to old without considering the value of insurance to 
those who otherwise would go without. 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 
257, 258, 270 (2006). 
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transfer at all. It’s an intertemporal transfer. She’s putting a down payment 
on health insurance for her older self. And that health insurance will buy 
tomorrow’s medicine, which likely will be better than today’s. Understood 
from this perspective, debate over intergenerational wealth distribution be-
comes considerably less urgent. 
Kahn and Kahn also assert that a group of prominent economists, in de-
fending the ACA from constitutional challenge in an amicus filing, 
characterized the uptick in premiums that occurs when the young and 
healthy exit risk pools as an “externality.” In discussing risk pooling, how-
ever, the economists didn’t make any claim about externalities.15
On their central point, Kahn and Kahn are just wrong on the facts. The 
fairness of compelling healthy individuals to participate in community-rated 
risk pools was a core feature of the political debate. For just a few examples 
drawn from late 2009: A former Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal deploring the 
“massively unfair form of income redistribution” that would occur when 
“younger, healthier, lower-income earners would be forced to subsidize old-
er, sicker, higher-income earners.”
 That was 
deliberate. When a young, healthy individual opts out of a community-rated 
risk pool, the resulting premium increase is a price signal that allows those 
remaining in the risk pool to decide whether they value insurance at more 
than its going price. Opting out in this way doesn’t necessarily give rise to 
the sort of allocational inefficiency to which we normally attach the label 
“externality” (although we might still worry about the efficient distribution 
of health goods given how hard it is to make an adequately informed choice 
about the need for health insurance). To the extent insurance is an ordinary 
market good, opting out instead gives rise to a pecuniary externality—a 
price effect arising out of a choice to buy or not to buy a good in a competi-
tive market. Economists do not typically worry about pecuniary 
externalities; they applaud them. Kahn and Kahn thus need not worry that 
the economists’ defense of the ACA would also stand as a defense of a gov-
ernment mandate to purchase a car in order to keep car prices high and prop 
up the auto industry. And in any event, nothing turns on the externality label 
because—externality or not—the point stands that sustaining a health-
insurance market for higher-risk populations depends on some form of 
community rating. 
16
                                                                                                                      
 15. See Brief for Economic Scholars in Support of Appellees as Amici Curiae, Thomas 
More Law Center v. Barack Hussein Obama, at 13-14 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2388) (describ-
ing the cost escalation arising from adverse selection without calling it an externality) 
[hereinafter Economists’ Br.]. 
 A large insurer opposed to health-care 
reform released a study, widely covered by the press, showing that, under 
the ACA, “prices would trend much higher for healthy people,” particularly 
for younger customers, but that “[o]lder, sicker individuals would tend to 
 16. Michael O. Leavitt et al., Health “Reform” Is Income Redistribution, Wall St. J., 
Sept. 28, 2009, at A21. 
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see cost decreases.”17 And members of Congress hotly debated the fairness 
of community rating on the floor of both the House and Senate.18
Nor did the public debate ignore the ACA’s broader distributional con-
sequences. At a hearing, Senator Cornyn characterized the ACA’s 
“subsidies, fee and taxes” as “a huge income redistribution.”
 We could 
go on. 
19 Senator Ben 
Nelson thought the tax-and-transfer provisions amounted to “class war-
fare.”20 And the day after President Obama signed the ACA, the New York 
Times ran a front-page story declaring it “the federal government’s biggest 
attack on economic inequality since inequality began rising more than three 
decades ago.”21
* * * 
 If the ACA’s distributional effects were hidden, they were 
not hidden well. 
Although Kahn and Kahn focus on the individual mandate, the broader 
goals of the act—and the question of how to pay to achieve them—were 
subjected to lengthy, rigorous, and rancorous public debate. Indeed, the bat-
tle over the ACA was the culmination of a war over universal coverage that 
has raged for nearly one hundred years. Having heard exhaustive arguments 
about wealth distribution, the democratically elected Congress still deter-
mined that a status quo in which 52 million people lacked insurance in 2010 
and millions more would lose insurance in ensuing years was unacceptable. 
As the economists with whom Kahn and Kahn disagree succinctly put it in 
their amicus filing, “This tradition of assuring the availability of some mi-
nimal level of treatment to all Americans without regard to ability to pay 
reflects a collective decision that we are, as a Nation, generally unwilling to 
see others come to great harm for lack of access to medical care.”22
                                                                                                                      
 17. Avery Johnson, WellPoint Attacks Health Legislation, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 2009. 
 Amen. 
 18. Compare 155 Cong. R. S10745-46 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Enzi); 155 Cong. R. H12450 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Rep. Gingrey), with 155 
Cong. H6144 (daily ed. June 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Schwartz). 
 19. Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senate Panel Softening Insurance Penalties, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 1, 2009. 
 20. Michael O’Brien, Nelson: CBO Analysis ‘Devastating’ to Health Reform; Slams 
House Bill as “Class Warfare”, The Hill’s Blog Briefing Room, July 17, 2009, the-
hill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/lawmaker-news/50657-nelson-cbo-analysis-
devastating-to-health-reform-slams-house-bill-as-class-warfare. 
 21. David Leonhardt, In Health Bill, Obama Attacks Wealth Inequality, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 23, 2010. 
 22. Economists’ Br., supra note 15, at 10. 
